Overview
- A GitHub report and repository inspection show Postman’s macOS desktop installer recorded an “auto-existing-upgrade” that added Postman plugins to OpenAI Codex and Anthropic Claude Code and placed a Postman CLI on the machine.
- Installer source code in the postman-plugin repo calls Codex APIs to list hooks, compute a hook hash, and write a trusted_hash into Codex’s user config, which is how the installer attempts to approve its own session-start hook.
- The installed session-start hook instructs coding agents to load Postman’s postman:api-engineer skill for broad API engineering tasks, effectively routing many API workflows into Postman unless a user removes the hook.
- Configs added by the installer pointed Codex at Postman’s MCP endpoint (https://mcp.postman.com/mcp) but Codex logged authentication failures, and the published evidence shows configuration changes rather than any confirmed data exfiltration.
- Developers and security researchers have called for explicit opt-in, removal of installer-side self-approval, and a complete rollback/uninstall procedure to clear agent configs, trusted hooks, marketplaces, MCP entries, and CLI artifacts while Postman has not yet issued a public response in the cited coverage.