Overview

• Investigators said OceanGate’s engineering process produced a carbon‑fiber pressure vessel with anomalies that failed necessary strength and durability requirements.
• The Titan was not adequately tested, and flawed analysis of real‑time monitoring data left the company unaware of damage that should have triggered immediate removal from service after dive 80.
• Damage sustained after dives 80 and 82 deteriorated into a local buckling failure on dive 88, when the vessel imploded during its descent to the Titanic site.
• The report says following standard emergency‑response guidance could have led to earlier discovery of the wreckage, conserving time and resources even though a rescue was impossible.
• The findings align with an August Coast Guard report that deemed the tragedy preventable, and the victims were Stockton Rush, Paul‑Henri Nargeolet, Hamish Harding, and Shahzada Dawood with his son, who joined a commercial trip that sold seats for about $250,000.