Overview
- Kelp, which on Tuesday published a memo and a relaunch plan, says LayerZero personnel approved its 1‑of‑1 verifier setup, a single attestor model that let one party approve cross‑chain messages.
- LayerZero rejects that account and says Kelp downgraded from its default multi‑verifier model to a 1‑of‑1 configuration, and it has since stopped signing messages for any apps that use a single verifier.
- Chainalysis and other researchers report the April 18 attack targeted off‑chain infrastructure by hijacking RPC nodes to feed false data, which tricked the lone verifier into attesting burns that never happened.
- Kelp says the exploit drained 116,500 rsETH and that pausing contracts limited further loss, with Chainalysis estimating a second theft of about $95 million was averted as lending markets froze and Aave halted rsETH pairs.
- Roughly $71 million tied to the exploit remains frozen on Arbitrum in a New York court fight, and data cited by reporters shows many LayerZero apps used similar single‑verifier setups, raising wider risk concerns.