Overview
- An expert committee led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman presented its comprehensive assessment to Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir and the General Staff on Monday, with orders to disseminate the findings across IDF frameworks and courses.
- The review identified six core causes of failure, including a conceptual misreading of Hamas, intelligence analysis breakdowns, neglect of the 'Jericho Wall' plan, flawed organizational culture, a gap between threats and response, and poor decision‑making and deployment on the night of October 7.
- The committee concluded the attack did not stem from a lack of information, stating that high‑quality intelligence had been collected but was not professionally analyzed to trigger warning or readiness.
- Systemic shortcomings were found across multiple bodies, including the General Staff, Operations and Intelligence directorates, Southern Command, Gaza Division, the Air Force, and the Navy.
- Recommendations include forming a multidisciplinary team under the Deputy Chief of Staff, prioritizing readiness for surprise‑war scenarios, continuing Intelligence Directorate reforms focused on early warning, reviewing regional defense doctrine, elevating headquarters professionalism, and commissioning a broader inter‑organizational investigation beyond the IDF.