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DEF CON Demo Shows Browser Extensions Can Hijack Passkeys

A proof-of-concept using malicious extensions to intercept WebAuthn calls highlights the need for tighter browser controls.

Overview

  • SquareX researchers detailed at DEF CON 33 how a malicious extension can intercept passkey setup in the browser and replace WebAuthn calls with attacker-controlled code.
  • The attack generates an attacker’s own key pair, can exfiltrate the private key, and can prompt users to re-register so the new passkey can be stolen.
  • From the user’s perspective the prompts appear legitimate, and common enterprise security tools do not provide visibility into this browser-layer manipulation.
  • The findings are a proof-of-concept with no confirmed in-the-wild cases reported, underscoring that passkeys still depend on a trusted browser environment.
  • With more than 15 billion passkeys now in use, researchers advise auditing or removing untrusted extensions, keeping browsers updated, using antivirus, pairing sign-ins with authenticator apps, and limiting devices for sensitive logins.